A question of interpretation

Danny, and Danny's Minions, seem to have adopted a very strange set of rules of interpretation.

There was, of course, the whole Ruelokke affair, in which Danny Williams-Government was entirely unwilling to concede the plain meaning of s. 12 of the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act:

[33] The Respondent concedes that it is bound by the Panel’s selection of the Applicant as CEO of the Board because section 24(3) of the Act states that, “...the chief executive officer shall be appointed by both the federal government and the provincial government after having been selected in accordance with section 12". On the other hand, the Respondent takes the position that it is not bound by the decision of the Panel with respect to the appointment of the Chair of the Board because the mandatory language of section 24 of the Act does not appear in section 12 of the Act. In supporting its position, the Respondent argues that:

“In arguing that he has a right to the position of Chairman, Mr. Ruelokke relies on section 12(6) of the Act which states that “The decision of the panel selecting a Chairman of the Board is final and binding on both governments”. However, this section does not create an enforceable legal right to a position. Rather, s. 12(6) functions as a privative clause that requires a court to show deference to the Panel’s decision if the federal or provincial governments seek judicial review of the Panel’s recommendation”.

[34] I reject the Respondent’s argument that section 12(6) of the Act contains a privative clause which is intended to prevent the courts from reviewing the selection of the Panel. Section 12 of the Act is intended to provide a mechanism for the appointment of the Chair of the Board in the event the federal and provincial governments disagree on a candidate. In order to emphasize the finality of the Panel’s choice it specifically states that the selection is binding “on both governments”.

Now, we have Education Minister Joan Burke claiming, in respect of s. 51 of the Memorial University Act:

It’s legislation that this will be a cabinet appointment, and it will be…

Well, certainly they knew the legislation, if they weren’t familiar with it, they can have a read through it, and they can see that it is a cabinet appointment…

This has always been an appointment of cabinet…

Yeah, Joan, and we have always been at war with Eastasia.

Then it's Tom Marshall, making it a triumvirate of Great Lawyers™, arguing

"Everyone is entitled to their view. He’s given his analysis. I consider his analysis a literal interpretation — a strict, constructionist interpretation. A proper interpretation of the legislation would have to consider the wording in context. When you consider the wording in context, the minister of Education plays a very important role."

And finally, Joan Burke, as relayed by Pam Frampton, with another curious interpretation:

Her response: "We have had no correspondence from the board of regents and the presidential committee."

Really? So how did Minister Burke know there were two shortlisted candidates winnowed out from a longer list by the search committee?

According to Burke's public relations specialist, Nora Daly, "The minister became aware of the short (list) last winter/spring through routine contact with the chair of the board of regents."

Well, golly, I'm no education minister, but to me "routine contact" certainly falls under the definition of correspondence.

Indeed it does.

Which makes a body wonder... when it comes to other legislation, let's say, the Access to Information Act, or the requests made under that Act, how are they interpreting words like "correspondence"?

Literally?

Strictly?

Constructionist-ly?

Or do they consider the words in context?