Wrinkles (II)

A transcript of yesterday’s bizarro-world FishCast interview between John Furlong and Brian Peckford, who apparently doesn’t know that in Dannystan he’s not allowed to comment on stuff anymore, during which they keep the faith – there really is no other word – in the “trade deals” myth:

FURLONG: Well, as I read the correspondence that you outlined in your article in The Telegram, there’s lots of evidence you were concerned, but was there any sign that the feds acknowledged that this was going on?

PECKFORD: I think they acknowledged it by their silence, because I don’t remember them ever coming really back and saying, “no, we’re not doing this,” if you will. Since that time, I’ve done a bit more research in the documents that I quoted in that article, for example, we did know, back in 1983, that for the year 1982, 66,000 metric tonnes of cod was allocated to foreign places. Of that amount, about 20,000 was in 2J3KL inside the 200-mile limit. So, and on it goes, for redfish, and turbot, and flatfish, and so on.

FURLONG: Presumably, this was then to, either used as barter or to sweeten deals that would allow for higher trades of Canadian wheat or Canadian wines, or there would have been something in it for Canada like that.

PECKFORD: Yes, yes. And this is where it gets a bit fuzzy for me right now. But I do remember even a piece of correspondence that I don’t have right now, where I actually highlighted what it was they were involved in at the time, right, in trading fish to get something back. So there were two things at play, one was to allocate additional quantities of fish for so-called “market access”. But as we argued in all the documents through the 1980s, you were cutting off your nose in spite of our face, because you were giving them fish that they then would have, and therefore we wouldn’t be able to get a market for what was left back in Newfoundland. So, I mean, it’s counterproductive to say “I’m going to get more markets for my fish by giving them more raw fish.” Well, then, that only reduces the market that we’re going to get. And all of the fish, obviously, should have been allocated to Canada. So these discretionary allocations, right, there were some to the French that had to be done, because of the history of the French Shore, blah blah blah [sic], the Treaty of Versailles, Utrecht, and all the rest of them, and the Treaty of Paris, until we got that final d— [signal fade]. But there were some discretionary allocations of fish. And I think the most telling one, John, was where I quoted the letter I sent to Mr. Crosbie, where, that was actually happening at that time, that was in 1987, where I actually say the Government of Canada has offered non-surplus 2J3KL cod, in other words northern cod, to France. And highlighting in that letter, too, by the way, the fact that, you know, northern cod was in trouble. Right back to 1980 we were arguing with the federal government that the northern cod was in trouble, so when in 1983 it actually failed, people like myself, and a lot of fishermen, a lot of inshore fishermen around Newfoundland, knew this was going to happen.

FURLONG: And this was, this particular incident, this was in advance, I believe, of the arrival of the Prime Minister of France, in an effort to, this was your famous “they sold the shop” comment, to try to smooth relations between Canada and France over the St. Pierre boundary issue, is that right?

PECKFORD: Exactly, this was part of the boundary, that’s what’s mentioned in that letter.

FURLONG: And John Crosbie apologized for the way it was done, but not for the fact that it was done?

PECKFORD: Exactly. Yup.

FURLONG: And is it too, does it make any kind of economic sense, though, for Canada, I mean, maybe there are, maybe it is more economical for Canada to be more concerned about trading wheat, or trading Canadian wines, or lumber, than it is to be trading fish?

PECKFORD: Then they should make that case. And that’s the problem we’ve had in Newfoundland, is that the feds, especially in the fishery area, they have never made that case. You know, all of these documents that I quoted, you go back and read up the total documents, all the pages, the whole documents, all of them, up through from 1980 right through to 1987, 88, we were making a case. And that case was never, what shall I say, destroyed, or destructed, by anything coming back from the feds. That’s the sad part about it, the silence was golden, right, because being so small, and at that time, not as powerful as we are now, they could easily ignore what we were saying. They even ignored us, John, during the patriation of the Constitution, we had all the province on side to do a new deal on fisheries jurisdiction, whereby the powers would be balanced more fairly, and we would have more say, and it was the federal government who, unilaterally if you will, just said no.

FURLONG: Now I presume you won’t get a lot of support in Ottawa for this analysis, because, you know, no one will confirm it to you, and I presume there’s nothing written down that anyone will point to, and is that because Ottawa, what, is too sensitive to allow this kind of thing to squirt out there?

PECKFORD: Yeah. I don’t know, I mean, like historically, the present government in Ottawa could easily acknowledge, you know, that these things did happen, and we weren’t there, we weren’t at the wheel, right? So, they could easily do that now, if they wanted to, but as I said in my piece, you know, historically, you know, there’s an awful lot of ammunition available to say that this trading kind of circumstance was going on which was detrimental to the best interests of Newfoundland.

FURLONG: But, you know, when you mention that it against Newfoundland’s interests, even though it would be against Newfoundland’s interest, it would be in the interests of Ontario or the Prairies and I guess the reality is that there’s more votes in Ontario, in Canadian wine country, or out west in the wheat industry, than there are the seven votes in Newfoundland in the fishery.

PECKFORD: Absolutely. Absolutely, and that’s why we weren’t successful at the time. Notwithstanding all these documents. However, there was a fairly, I did a cross-country tour a couple of times on the fishery and stuff, there was an acknowledgement that we weren’t a fair deal on the whole fishery thing, and that’s why even some of the more reluctant provinces agreed to this new constitutional change, and had all the provinces on side.

FURLONG: So you’re saying that it’s reasonable to believe that based on the documentation in your possession, about the federal government and fish quotas, Ottawa was trading fish off the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, for, we’ll say, “questionable return, either in the form of so-called ‘market access’ or other products”?

PECKFORD: Or for other levers that would enhance other places in Canada, yes, that’s what I’m saying. The information that I have leads me to believe that there’s validity in that statement. Now, it’s up to somebody else to prove me wrong, you know.

FURLONG: That’s former Premier Brian Peckford. Now later this afternoon I received this note from him, and he says that he found the information he was looking for, and he says, the total allocation of cod to foreign countries so allocated in 1982, 66,000 metric tonnes, of cod, redfish 52,000 tonnes, flatfish 10,000, and turbot 11,000. He says of the cod, 20,000 tonnes was northern cod. That’s from Brian Peckford.

There’s a lot in there to be digested.

But for the time being, digest this: No, Brian Peckford. It’s your contention that fish was traded for other trade considerations. Now, it’s up to you to prove yourself right.

You know.